基于优先权拍卖的产能分配机制研究

本文考虑一个供应商和两个独立零售商构成的供应链系统。当供应商的产能受到约束时，零售商可能会竞争有限的产能。本文提出将“优先分配权”作为一个有价值的标的物进行拍卖，按照出价高低确定优先分配顺序。本文证明了优先权拍卖机制属于共同价值模型，并提出了两类拍卖机制：事先拍卖和事后拍卖。本文证明两类优先权拍卖机制均会促使零售商提交真实的需求作为订单量，并且满足收益等价定理。而就供应商期望利润而言，事后优先权拍卖机制要高于事先优先权拍卖机制。     

The governance of social enterprises: Mission drift and accountability challenges in hybrid organizations

We examine the challenges of governance facing organizations that pursue a social mission through the use of market mechanisms. These hybrid organizations, often referred to as social enterprises, combine aspects of both charity and business at their core. In this paper we distinguish between two ideal types of such hybrids, differentiated and integrated, and we conceptualize two key challenges of governance they face: accountability for dual performance objectives and accountability to multiple principal stakeholders. We revisit the potential and limitations of recently introduced legal forms to address these challenges. We then theorize about the importance of organizational governance and the role of governing boards in particular, in prioritizing and aligning potentially conflicting objectives and interests in order to avoid mission drift and to maintain organizational hybridity in social enterprises. Finally, we discuss future research directions and the implications of this work for rethinking traditional categories of organizations, namely business and charity.     

Morality rebooted: Exploring simple fixes to our moral bugs

Ethics research developed partly in response to calls from organizations to understand and solve unethical behavior. We examine two approaches to mitigating unethical behavior: (1) values-oriented approaches that broadly appeal to individuals’ preferences to be more moral, and (2) structure-oriented approaches that redesign specific incentives, tasks, and decisions to reduce temptations to cheat in the environment. This paper explores how these approaches can change behavior. We argue that integrating both approaches while avoiding incompatible strategies can reduce the risk of adverse effects that arise from taking a single approach and leverage the strengths of both approaches.     

CEO duality and firm performance: The moderating roles of other executives and blockholding outside directors

This study examines how the effect of CEO duality on firm performance is affected by two internal governance forces – namely other executives in the top management team and blockholding outside directors. Results based on a longitudinal dataset from the U.S. computer industry were consistent with my hypotheses. Specifically, I found that the effect of CEO duality was negative when the CEO had dominant power relative to other executives and when the board had a blockholding outside director, but was nonsignificant otherwise. This study enriches our understanding of the effect of CEO duality, and helps reinforce the call for the nonduality structure as the default choice and put the burden of proof on those who wish to justify otherwise on special grounds.     

Shadow Insurance

Life insurers use reinsurance to move liabilities from regulated and rated companies that sell policies to shadow reinsurers, which are less regulated and unrated off‐balance‐sheet entities within the same insurance group. U.S. life insurance and annuity liabilities ceded to shadow reinsurers grew from $11 billion in 2002 to $364 billion in 2012. Life insurers using shadow insurance, which capture half of the market share, ceded 25 cents of every dollar insured to shadow reinsurers in 2012, up from 2 cents in 2002. By relaxing capital requirements, shadow insurance could reduce the marginal cost of issuing policies and thereby improve retail market efficiency. However, shadow insurance could also reduce risk‐based capital and increase expected loss for the industry. We model and quantify these effects based on publicly available data and plausible assumptions.     

Will they stay or will they go? How network properties of WebICs predict dropout rates of valuable Wikipedians

This paper contributes to our understanding of an increasingly prevalent work system, web-based internet communities (WebICs). We are particularly interested in how WebICs are governed given the fact how different they are compared to more classical forms of organization. We study the governance of a WebIC by studying the structure and dynamics of their edit network. Given the fact that the edit network is a relational structure, social network analysis is key to understanding these work systems. We demonstrate that characteristics of the edit network contribute to predicting the dropout hazard of valuable WebIC members. Since WebICs exist only thanks to the activity of their contributors, predicting drop-outs becomes crucial. The results show that reputation and controversy have different effects for different types of Wikipedians; i.e., an actor’s reputation decreases the dropout hazard of active Wikipedians, while participation on controversial pages decreases the dropout hazard of highly active Wikipedians.     

信息不对称、流动性与股权结构——基于深圳证券市场的实证研究

以金融市场微观结构视角对股权结构进行研究的趋势正在兴起,本文从金融市场微观结构层面考察了在信息不对称影响下股权结构与流动性的关系,通过对在深圳证券交易所上市的2004年和2007年的样本公司研究发现,股权结构变量在2004年主要作用于信息成本来影响流动性水平,而2007年则主要通过改变交易成本来影响流动性水平.股改前的2004年,直接控股股东持股对交易成本无显著影响,而在股改后的2007年则显著增加了交易成本.随着基金的发展壮大,基金持股对流动性的影响逐渐显现,并一定程度上导致交易成本的增加.代表股权集中度的大股东个数则同时增加了信息成本和交易成本,损害了流动性水平.     

控股股东代理成本、纳税筹划方案抉择及其市场价值:基于J有限公司的案例研究

纳税筹划是实务界与学术界共同关心的领域,现有研究大量讨论了公司纳税筹划行为的决定因素及其经济后果,但仍存在巨大争议。一方面,纳税筹划节约了现金流,提升股东价值;另一方面,代理问题使企业的纳税筹划方案更可能有利于控股股东或管理层,而非上市公司利益最大化,从而可能降低企业价值,最终纳税筹划方案的经济后果取决于上述两方面的共同作用。本文基于某上市公司(J有限公司)收购大股东土地案例,分析了代理成本影响公司税务决策的路径及其经济后果。本文发现,控股股东构造了较为复杂的股权转移交易方式,为上市公司和控股股东节约了大量税务成本。但由于代理成本的存在,在多种纳税筹划方案中,控股股东并未选择对上市公司最为有利的方案,而选择了能够取得现金最多,控股股东利益最大化的方案。进一步的研究发现,市场非常关注该企业的纳税筹划行为,与本文搜集的对照样本相比,尽管J公司的控股股东未选择最优的方案,但投资者仍给予了该纳税筹划行为以积极反应,提升了企业价值。本文为研究代理成本影响公司税务决策的机理提供了重要参考。     

产品市场竞争、融资约束与公司现金持有:基于中国制造业上市公司的实证分析

本文采用我国制造业上市公司2001年-2007年共2401个公司年的平衡面板数据,利用行业间竞争、行业内竞争两个维度的产品市场竞争变量,实证分析了我国制造业上市公司产品市场竞争对现金持有水平的综合影响。实证结果显示,对于所有制造业上市公司来说,产品市场竞争对公司现金持有存在显著的掠夺风险效应。在考虑公司融资约束的情况下,产品市场竞争对公司现金持有的掠夺风险和代理成本两种竞争效应被有效区分开来。融资约束公司表现为显著的掠夺风险效应,非融资约束公司则表现为显著的代理成本效应。这些研究结论不仅丰富和补充了产品市场竞争与公司现金持有之间的相关研究,也为公司实施积极的现金流风险管理和持有现金的高效利用提供了实践支持。